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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY CHRISTIAN DAVIS 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20050952 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. Issue: Do the facts proved establish a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-10-503(2)(a)? R 103-108, 112. 
Standard of review: While the appellate court views the facts in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), where the issue on appeal is whether the facts 
proved at trial constitute the offense charged, the question presented is one of law, 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Winward, 907.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1995). 
b. Issue: Was it prejudicial error for the district court to allow Agent 
Seegmiller to testify that he understood the statute in question to prohibit the mere 
handling of a firearm and that "possession" of the firearm was established by defendant's 
concession that his fingerprints would be found on the weapon. R 134, at 131-132. 
Standard of review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling 
on admissibility for abuse of discretion. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 10, 122 P.3d 
639. 
c. Issue: Do the facts proved establish the existence of a Drug-Free Zone 
permitting the enhancement of the offenses charged in Counts 2 and 3 of the 
Information? R 103-108, 112. 
Standard of review: The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that the appellate court reviews for correctness. State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 
(Utah App. 1996). 
d. Issue: Was it prejudicial error for the district court to instruct the jury 
that a bike palh was a "public park" as a matter of law? R 135, at 318. 
Standard of review: Trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness, without deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. State v. Powasnik, supra. 
e. Issue: Was it prejudicial error for the district court to permit the 
introduction of hearsay concerning defendant's alleged possession of a firearm, 
notwithstanding the fact that such hearsay was purportedly received for the limited 
2 
purpose of supplying background and continuity concerning subsequent police conduct? 
R 134, at 41-42, 139-140. 
Standard of review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling 
on the admissibility of hearsay for abuse of discretion. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, j^ 
10, 122P.3d639. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The texts of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(4)(a) and 76-10-503(2)(a) are 
set out in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. The appeal is taken 
from a judgment of conviction, sentence, and the order denying defendant's motion to 
arrest judgment. 
Proceedings in the Lower Court. Defendant Gary Christian Davis was charged with 
the following crimes: Count 1: POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON, a 2nd Degree Felony; Count 2: POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 2nd Degree Felony; and Count 3: POSSESSION OF 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class A Misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, the 
defendant was found guilty of all offenses charged. 
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Disposition in the Trial Court. The district court denied defendant's motion to arrest 
judgment and imposed the following sentence: Terms of one to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison were imposed on each of Counts 1 and 2, to run consecutively with each 
other and with the sentences previously imposed in other proceedings. A term of one 
year in the Washington County Jail was imposed on Count 3 to run concurrently with the 
sentence imposed on Count 2. The defendant currently is incarcerated. 
Statement of Facts. Acting upon a tip from an informant, parole officers approached 
Room 106 of the Ridgeview Inn on South Bluff Street in St. George. R 134, at 57, 139-
140. They were attempting to locate the defendant who was under the supervision of the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole. R 134, at 57-58. Room 106 had been rented 
by one Jeremy Arrington.. R135, at 211, 239. Arrington was not in the room when the 
officers arrived but the defendant was present along with two other adults, Paul 
Richardson and Elisha Miller. R 134, at 74. 
Once inside the room, parole officers also found drug paraphernalia which 
contained trace amounts of methamphetamine. R 134, at 75-76. Shortly thereafter, 
Agent Kim Seegmiller literally stumbled upon a rifle which was lying on the floor along 
side of the bed in a gun case and at least partially concealed by the bedding. R 134, at 
87. Upon questioning by the officers, the defendant denied having anything to do with 
the weapon but conceded that his fingerprints might be found on the rifle. R 134, at 99. 
He further conceded that if tested his urine would be dirty. R 134, at 113, 116. The 
defendant was arrested and charged with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
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Restricted Person, Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug-Free Zone, and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug-Free Zone. 
Arrington arrived while the officers were still on the premises and was 
detained briefly. R 135, at 228-229. Arrington, Richardson and Miller were neither 
arrested nor charged. 
Prior to the presentation of evidence, the defendant moved the court for an 
order in limine, limiting the officers' testimony concerning the above-mentioned 
informant's tip to the fact that they went to the motel because the defendant was on 
parole and they had received information that the defendant was at the motel and 
excluding the other information as hearsay. R 134, at 41-42. That motion was granted. 
R 134, at 42. However, when the State presented its case, Agent Bower was permitted to 
testify over defendant's hearsay objection that the officers had gone to the Ridgeview Inn 
looking for the defendant based upon a tip from an informant who had told law 
enforcement officers that the defendant "was supposedly in a motel room in the St. 
George area with possibly a gun and dope." R 134, at 139-140. In admitting the hearsay 
the district court instructed the jury that it was received for the sole purpose of explaining 
the officers' conduct. R 134, at 139-140. 
The State then called Paul Richardson as its witness. R 134 at 143143-165. 
Richardson denied any knowledge of any nexus between the defendant and the firearm 
or the controlled substances. 
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When the State rested, the defendant was granted a continuance on the 
grounds that, although under subpoena, Jeremy Arrington had failed to appear for trial. 
When the trial began Arrington was in the custody of federal authorities for some federal 
offense which he had allegedly committed in Salt Lake County. R 134, at 173-185. The 
defendant was granted this continuance based upon defense counsel's representation that 
Arrington was a material witness and would testify that he (Arrington) had rented the 
motel room in question and was the person who had brought the firearm into the room. 
When the trial resumed, the State reopened its case for the purpose of 
calling Arrington as its own witness. R 135, at 201-235. Moreover, during the extended 
recess the prosecution had located Elisha Miller who was also called as a State's witness. 
R 135, at 252-269. 
Arrington testified that state and federal prosecutors had granted him 
transactional immunity in exchange for his agreement to testify truthfully in the case 
against the defendant. R 135, at 206-207; Exhibit No. P-29. Arrington then testified that 
his wife had rented Room 106 on his behalf and that he had used the room as a base for 
selling illicit drugs. R 135, at 211-212, 239-242, 244. He further testified that he had 
telephoned the defendant and others and advised them that he had drugs for sale. R 135, 
at213. 
Arrington also testified thai he had borrowed the firearm in question from a 
third party at smother location. R 135, at 217-218, 237-238, 244-245. He further 
testified that he then brought the weapon back to the motel room and showed it to the 
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defendant and Richardson. R 135, at 219-220. According to Arrington, he had 
attempted to insert the empty magazine into the rifle. R 135, at 220-221.] When he 
failed in this attempt, the defendant and Richardson each took a turn at trying to insert 
the magazine. They likewise failed in their attempts. R 135, at 220-221. Arrington then 
put the rifle in the gun case and placed it on the floor where Agent Seegmiller later found 
it. R 135, at 221-222. Thereafter, Arrington again left the motel room to go to the store. 
When he returned law enforcement officers were already in Room 106. R 135, at 228-
229. 
Under cross-examination Arrington testified as follows: 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Did you leave the motel 
room for the purpose of going and getting this weapon? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you tell anybody at the motel that you were going 
to get a weapon? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. So about maybe a half hour or an hour later you 
come back in with this weapon? 
A. Yes, sir. It had — when you're high it's — you don't 
know how long you're doing - you say you're going to be 
gone 10 minutes and you're gone two hours. 
Q. So you have no idea, really, how long you were gone? 
A. No, sir. 
i Neither Arrington nor any one else in the motel room ever had any ammunition for the 
rifle. R 135, at 245-246. 
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Q. Okay. Now was there any ammunition with this 
weapon? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever seen any ammunition that would fit into 
this weapon? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now you came into the room with the weapon and it 
was inside the case; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now where was Mr. Davis when you came into the 
room? 
A. Direct spot or -
Q. Yeah. Where was he; do you recall? In your mind's 
eye can you see it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. All right. Did you see him observing you in your 
mind's eye? Can you recall that? 
A. Yeah. It was like me bringing some new toy. 
Everybody wants to look at it. It's like something you notice 
— I mean look at it, it's noticeable. 




Q. Do you remember Mr. Davis saying anything to you 
about this weapon when you brought it into the room? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember Mr. Richardson saying 
anything to you about it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you do when you first got into the room with 
that weapon? What did you do with it? 
A. I opened it up and showed them. 
Q. Right immediately? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You opened it up and said, "Look what I got"? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Then you took the weapon out and you tried to 
put the clip in it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You couldn't get it to go in? 
A. It would not like block up in there. It would kind of 
be loose and stuff. 
Q. Okay. Then what did you do with the weapon? 
A. People just wanted to look at it or try to fix it, so — 
Q. Somebody wanted to try to fix it, wanted to see if they 
could put the clip into it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. Everybody in the room. 
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Q. Who was everybody in the room at that time? 
A. Me, Chris, Paul. Alisha was in the room, but I don't 
think she really — you know, she didn't -
Q. You didn't think she was particularly mechanically 
inclined? 
A. Yeah. Huh-uh. After I got through with it I pretty 
much went and started doing my own thing, so it wasn't --1 
wasn't paying attention to every person and what they did 
exactly with that gun. 
Q. Did you hand this weapon to Chris? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see Chris pick the weapon up? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see him with it in his possession? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What was he doing with it in his possession? 
A. Working with the clip. 
Q. Just trying to put the clip in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did he have this in his possession? 
A. Not long. I don't know exactly. 
Q. So he handled it for how long? 
A. I don't know. I was off doing something else. 
Q. Seconds - 3 0 seconds? 
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A. I can't ~ I don't know. 
Q. You don't know. You just remember at some point in 
time you saw Chris pick up the gun and try to put the clip in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Did he ever have any conversation with you 
about the gun? 
A. Not really. Like where did it come from or how much 
are paying for it or something like that, I don't know, no. 
Q. You don't — okay. Did he ask you -
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did he ask you if he could buy it from you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he express any interest in using it or maintaining ~ 
or exercising control over it? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. You said that when you got picked up on, I 
guess, from running from the police for — on this unpaid 
traffic or whatever, you were put into purgatory and you did 
talk to Chris? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He asked you if you would take just the gun -
A. I approached Chris. 
Q. You approached — okay. Now let me back up. Did 
Chris ever accuse you of being a snitch? 
A. No, he just wondered what happened that day. 
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Q. He had asked you if you knew anything about why the 
police had shown up? 
A. It puts out in somebody's head, you know, we've got 
guns and drugs, and somebody don't go to jail. It opens up a 
lot of questions. 
Q. Yeah. So everybody is wondering why you didn't go 
to jail. 
A. Yeah. Chris was the only one that went to jail. 
Q. Okay. Did Chris threaten you? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. He didn't even accuse you, actually, did he? 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. He knew that you had brought that weapon into that 
room. 
A. Yes. 
Q. He asked you if you would admit that to his lawyer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he ~ when you say he asked you if you would take 
the gun charge — 
A. I more brought it to him, but questions that came after 
that it was like I've already asked that question and we just 
discussed it. Like I don't know how to explain it. 
Q. Okay. You approached him about taking the gun 
charge? 
A. Yeah. I wasn't - I didn't want him to get in trouble 
for my gun. 
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Q. Okay. So you --
A. He shouldn't. 
Q. So as I understand this, then, you approached him and 
you said, "That was my weapon. I'll admit that"? 
A. Yes. 
R 135, at 245-250. 
The State next called Elisha Miller who testified that Arrington "pulled the 
firearm out" and said, "You guys got to see what I got." R 135, at 259-260. Miller did 
not remember seeing anyone trying to put the empty clip in the weapon. R 135, at 261. 
However, she testified that the defendant held the weapon and struck a pose in the 
mirror. R 135, at 260-261. 
Under cross-examination Miller testified as follows: 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] So the weapon - when 
you first saw it, Mr. Arrington went to, I guess — 
A. It was being pulled out when I first saw it. 
Q. Okay. That was Mr. Arrington pulling it out? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You hadn't even seen — noticed it there before? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Was it in the case? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. All right. What did Mr. Arrington say? 
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A. "You guys have got to see what I got." Like quote, 
unquote, I guess. 
Q. Then what did he do with the gun? 
A. He unzipped the thing, pulled the gun out and just like 
held it up to show them, handed it over to Chris. 
Q. He just held it up and then handed it to Chris? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Then Chris looked in the mirror at it and then handed 
it to — 
A. To Paul. 
Q. - Paul. Okay. How long was Chris in possession or 
how long did he have that in his hand? 
A. Maybe a minute, if that. I mean he just — long enough 
to hold it up into the mirror and to look at his reflection, I 
guess. Not that long. 
Q. Then he handed it to Paul? 
A. To Paul. And Paul did the same thing. 
Q. What did Paul do with it? 
A. The exact same thing. He imitated it. 
Q. Okay. Just the same thing that Chris had done? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Then what did he -- how did he get rid of the weapon? 
A. He just put it back -- the case was open. He put it 
back into the case, and then that's --
Q. Okay. I know it's easy to say just a minute. 
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A. Uh-huh. 
Q. That really doesn't mean anything. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Could you give us your best estimate of how long — 
how long - if this were the weapon and I were picking it up, 
okay. I'm Chris and I'm picking it up. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Tell me when he's had it and when he's going to set it 
down - or hand it to Paul. 
A. Probably about now. 
Q. About 12 seconds, maybe? 
A. Yeah, probably - I mean I really don't remember. 
Q. Not very long? 
A. Not very long. 
Q. Did you hear Chris make any comment about the 
weapon? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. That he wanted to purchase it? 
A. No. 
Q. That he wanted to posses it or exercise control over it? 
A. No. 
Q. He handed it to Paul? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Paul did what with it? 
A. The exact same thing, just held it up and looked at his 
reflection in the mirror. 
Q. Then what did he do with it to dispose of it - to get it 
out of his hands? 
A. He laid it on the case. 
Q. Okay. Then what happened to it? 
A. It was zipped up and put back in its spot - into - put 
back into the place that it was brought out of. 
Q. Did you ever see anybody else touch that weapon? 
A. No, I did not. 
R 135, at 270-273. 
The State attempted to establish that the Ridgeview Inn was in a drug-free 
zone and that the controlled substance offenses with which the defendant was charged 
were subject to enhancement under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4). To 
this end the State elicited testimony from Agent Seegmiller to the effect that several 
motels, several restaurants, a dental clinic/office plaza, a Shell station/convenience store, 
a carwash, a Greyhound bus stop, and a bicycle and running trail maintained by the city 
of St. George were located within 1000 feet of the Ridgeview Inn. See R 134, at 59-62. 
The defendant did not testify and defended on the theoiy that this evidence 
was insufficient to establish that he had possessed the rifle "with the intent to control the 
use or management of the firearm." Regarding the drug charges, the defendant presented 
evidence that established that the Ridgeview Inn was not within 1000 feet of a "public 
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park" or a "public parking lot" (R 134, at 124-127; R 135, at 282-289; Exhibit Nos. D-5, 
D-6, D-7, D-8; D-9, D-30, D-31) and argued that motels, restaurants, professional 
offices, gas stations, convenience stores, carwashes, bus stops, and bike trails do not, 
under the relevant statute establish a drug-free zone. 
Over defendant's objection, the district court instructed the jury that the 
bike path located across the street from the Ridgeview Inn was a "public park" as a 
matter of law. R 135, at 318. 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. R 98-100. Thereafter, the 
defendant moved the court pursuant to the provisions Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, for an order arresting judgment on the grounds that the facts proved did not 
constitute the public offense of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person and did not establish the existence of a Drug-Free Zone. R 103-108. The court 
denied that motion, imposed sentence and entered judgment of conviction. R 112. This 
appeal followed. R 120-121. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence and the permissible inferences that can be drawn therefrom 
establish nothing more than the innocent handling of the firearm in question and clearly 
do not establish "possession with the intent to control its use or management." The error 
in allowing Agent Seegmiller to testify that he understood the statute in question to 
prohibit the mere handling of a firearm was prejudicial. 
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Utah law does not establish drug-free zones by reference to proximity to 
motels, restaurants, professional offices, gas stations, convenience stores, carwashes, bus 
stops, or bike trails and the district court erred in instructing the jury that the bike trail 
was a "public park" as a matter of law. 
Finally, it was prejudicial error to allow the introduction of hearsay 
suggesting that some unidentified third party had information concerning defendant's 
possession of a firearm which was of such gravity as to warrant contacting the police. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH A 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(a). 
In State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985), while two undercover police 
detectives were in defendant's home visiting with him and his friend, Brown, the 
defendant brought out a .22 caliber pistol and displayed it to the officers. He allowed the 
officers to handle the weapon, then took it back and kept it. The gun was left in the 
home when the officers departed. The officers later returned with a warrant, found the 
pistol on the fireplace mantel and arrested the defendant. Following his conviction the 
defendant appealed challenging, among other things, an instruction which had advised 
the jury that 
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm was more than 
the innocent handling of the weapon, but required a willing 
and knowing possession v/ith the intent to control its use or 
management. 
18 
Id. at 233. 
A similar instruction was given in the instant case. Indeed, it was given at 
the defendant's request. The defendant obviously concedes that the instruction is an 
accurate statement of the law and cites State v. Davis, supra, for the proposition that the 
public offense of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person requires 
proof sufficient to demonstrate an intent to control the use or management of the 
weapon. Id. The Davis opinion clearly indicates that the "innocent handling of [a] 
weapon" does not in itself make out the offense. Id. 
Amazingly, State v. Davis, supra, is the only Utah case that sheds any 
significant light upon the question of what constitutes "possession" in the context of a 
weapons violation. Even more surprising is the fact that, notwithstanding the pervasion 
of possession offenses in modem American criminal law, possession has managed to 
escape the serious scrutiny of courts and commentators. See Markus Dirk Dubber, 
Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINLOGY 829 (2002). Kansas appears to be one of the few jurisdictions which has 
approached the issue head on. 
In State v. Neal, 215 Kan. 737, 529 P.2d 114 (1974), the defendant, a 
convicted felon, purchased the pistol from a pawn shop. Approximately four months 
later, he pawned the gun at the same pawn shop. In his defense, Neal presented 
testimony to the effect that he was living in a house with two bedrooms and full 
basement; that one Sharon Meeker was living in the house with her two children; that 
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due to a series of crimes occurring in the neighborhood it was decided Meeker needed 
protection while Neal was working nights; that Neal and Meeker drove to the pawn shop 
where he went in and bought the gun while Meeker stayed in the car; on returning to the 
house the gun was placed in Meeker's bedroom closet where she had access to it at all 
times; that it remained untouched by defendant until he cleaned and took it to the pawn 
shop with Meeker where it was pawned. 
At the close of the evidence the defendant requested the following 
instruction on possession which was rejected: 
"Possession" means to have actual control, care and 
management of, and not a passing control, fleeting and 
shadowy in its nature. 
215 Kan. at 740. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, relying on State v. Runnels, 203 Kan. 513, 456 
P.2d 16 (1969) and State v. Phinis, 199 Kan. 472, 430 P.2d 251 (1969), reversed based 
on the error in refusing the requested instruction.2 Clearly, if the requested instruction 
2The Kansas court has repeatedly stated that the prohibition against felons possessing 
firearms does not include the innocent handling of a weapon, but targets the willful or 
knowing possession of a firearm with the intent to control the use and management thereof. 
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 229 Kan. 618, 620, 629 P.2d 181 (1981). While rejecting the 
defendant's argument that the use of a firearm in self-defense constituted a defense for an 
otherwise unlawful possession of a firearm, in State v. Jones, supra, the supreme court of 
Kansas noted the following by way of dictum: 
It is the nature and degree of the possession which may furnish 
a defense to the charge. Where the possession of the firearm is 
brief and without predesign or prior possession such possession 
is not prohibited by the statute, for in such use the possessor of 
the firearm lacks the required intent to control, and the 
possession is not purposeful and intentional. So it is not how 
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had been given, the verdict would have no doubt been upheld because the jury would 
have been free to reject the testimony the defendant offered to explain the innocence of 
his possession. 
In deciding State v. Davis, supra, the Utah Supreme Court cited Neal, 
Runnels, and Phinis with apparent approval. 711 P.2d at 233. In Davis, the defendant, 
in addition to questioning the adequacy of the jury instruction, also contended that the 
State's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. In affirming the conviction, the 
Utah Supreme Court noted the defendant's argument was based only on his interpretation 
of the evidence and that the theory he advanced was not the only reasonable 
interpretation. The trier of fact was free to reject the claims of defendant's witnesses. Id, 
at 234. Because the defendant's intent or state of mind need not be proved by direct 
evidence, the jury could have inferred from the fact that weapon was in defendant's 
home, the fact that defendant produced the pistol and displayed it to the officers, the fact 
that defendant had then taken the weapon back and kept it, and the fact that the weapon 
was found on the fireplace mantel when the officers returned with a warrant, that the 
defendant willingly and knowingly possessed the firearm with the intent to control its use 
or management. Id. 
In the instant case, Arrington and his wife rented the motel room where the 
firearm was located. Arrington left the room and procured the firearm without advising 
the firearm is used (in self-defense) that may furnish a defense, 
it is the nature and degree of the possession which may do so. 
229 Kan. at 620-21 (emphasis added). 
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the defendant or anyone else in the room that he was going to get a firearm. Arrington 
produced the firearm and exhibited it to the others in the motel room. The defendant 
handled the weapon for a matter of seconds and never expressed any interest in 
controlling its use or management. 
Arrington's and Miller's testimony is not evidence which the defendant 
offered in an attempt to explain the innocence of his possession, it is the sum and 
substance of the State's case. There is no basis for inferring that the defendant's 
connection to the weapon was anything greater than that which was directly established 
by the State's evidence. Indeed, the State apparently contends that the facts directly 
established by the evidence are sufficient to make out the offense without the need of 
drawing any inference. If this were the law, in State v. Davis, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court could have disposed of the defendant's insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument by 
simply declaring that the offense was established by the evidence that the defendant 
willingly and knowingly handled the pistol in the presence of the undercover police 
officers. A violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(a) clearly requires more --
more than the State's evidence can establish directly or by permissible inference. 
The defendant concedes that there is at least one court that has upheld a 
possession conviction based upon nothing more than the "innocent handling" of a 
firearm. In State v. Black, 242 Wis.2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363, 2001 WI 31, a divided 
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the 
defendant's no-contest plea and resulting conviction. The criminal complaint in that case 
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alleged that Black, a felon, possessed a firearm in violation of Wis. Stat. § 939.62. After 
being sentenced on his plea of "no contest," Black moved to withdraw his plea. 
The facts of the case were largely undisputed. Several Milwaukee police 
officers went to 1928 North 34th Street to investigate a narcotics complaint. The officers 
were admitted to defendant's girlfriend's upper residence and given permission to search. 
During the search, the officers found a black semi-automatic Ruger pistol between the 
mattress and box spring in the girlfriend's bedroom. Black lived in the lower unit. Black 
told the police that he had "handled the pistol on Monday [two days earlier] in 
[girlfriend's] bedroom," but that he did not know to whom the gun belonged. Prior to 
Black's plea hearing, the trial court received a letter from Black's girlfriend wherein she 
stated that she had purchased the firearm in question and that Black "only touched [the 
pistol] once looking at it after I purchased it." 
When the trial court denied the motion to withdraw his plea, Black 
appealed. The court of appeals reversed. Upon further review, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in a 3-to 2 decision, reversed the court of appeals. The majority reasoned: 
At the outset, we note the absence of any mens rea 
requirement in this statute. That is, the statute makes no 
reference to intent and therefore creates a strict liability 
offense. As a result, the State is only required to show that 
the felon "possessed" the firearm with knowledge that it is a 
firearm. In this context, "possess," according to the legal 
definition, simply "means that the defendant knowingly had 
actual physical control of a firearm." Furthermore, there are 
no temporal limitations in this statute. It does not specify 
what length of time a felon must possess the firearm in order 
to violate the statute. While to some it may seem unduly 
harsh that a felon who handles a firearm for a brief period 
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violates this statute, such a result comports with the theory of 
strict liability. As we have explained: 
The basic concept of strict liability is that 
culpability is not an element of the offense and 
that the state is relieved of the burdensome task 
of proving the offender's culpable state of 
mind.. . . 
. . . One of the objectives of the legislature in 
adopting the concept of strict liability in statutes 
designed to control conduct of many people, 
such as operating motor vehicles is to assure the 
quick and efficient prosecution of large 
numbers of violators. 
The statute at issue here, felon in possession of a firearm, 
applies to all felons and is designed by the legislature to 
control their conduct: it aims to prevent felons from 
possessing firearms. This is so "because the legislature has 
determined that felons are more likely to misuse firearms." 
We have further recognized that this statute is "aimed not at 
punishment but at protecting public safety through firearm 
regulation." With this goal in mind, the legislature struck a 
balance between the possibility of a harsh result to an 
individual felon and the greater good of protecting the public 
from felons with firearms. We decline to upset this balance 
by rewriting the statute with an intent requirement. In the 
present case, the complaint stated that Black "handled the 
pistol," which is sufficient to show possession because such 
an action amounts to exercising actual physical control over 
the firearm, even though it may have been only for a brief 
period of time. 
2001 WI 3 1 4 19 (citations omitted). 
The Wisconsin decision may, indeed, be the shape of things to come. The 
modern "war on crime," though ostensibly waged on behalf of crime victims, has been 
first and foremost a war on crimes which no longer involve the infliction of harm, but the 
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threat of harm. The policing tool of choice has become the crime of possession. See 
Dubber, Policing Possession, at 831-835. 
So broad is the reach of possession offenses, and so easy are 
they to detect and then to prove, that possession has replaced 
vagrancy as the sweep offense of choice. Unlike vagrancy, 
however, possession offenses promise more than a slap on 
the wrist. Backed by a wide range of penalties, they can 
remove undesirables for extended periods of time, even for 
life. Also unlike vagrancy, possession offenses so far have 
been insulated against constitutional attack, even though they 
too break virtually every law in the book of cherished 
criminal law principles. 
Id. at 836. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) (exploring "the 
wish to keep the old criminal 'punishment' facade" in a prevention system). 
The police regime embraced by the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court "manipulate^] familiar doctrines - like actus reus and mens rea - to reduce 
traditional criminal law to ceremonial significance." Dubber, Policing Possession, at 
834. Utah, on the other hand, continues to adhere to traditional principles under which 
punishment is administered based upon culpability, and to the extent the criminal law 
includes an aspect of pure threat control, Utah law still limits its "strict liability" offenses 
to those in which "the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose 
to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute 
without requiring proof of any culpable mental state." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102. 
The offense of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person 
requires proof of the defendant's blameworthy state of mind - his intent "to control the 
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use or management of the weapon." While this proof may be made by direct evidence or 
the permissible inferences drawn therefrom, clearly the bare proof of nothing more than 
the "innocent handling of [a] weapon" does not in itself make out the offense. Davis, 
711P.2dat233. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER TO TESTIFY THAT 
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION PROHIBITED THE MERE 
HANDLING OF A FIREARM. 
Over defendant's objection, the district court allowed Agent Seegmiller to 
testify that he understood the statute in question to prohibit the mere handling of a 
firearm and that "possession" of the firearm was established by defendant's concession 
that his fingerprints would be found on the weapon. 
Q. [BY STATE'S PROSECUTOR] Did his own 
statements such as "my fingerprints will be on it," did 
that come into play? 
A. [BY AGENT SEEGMILLER] It did. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Well, the reference he made was spontaneous that his 
fingerprints would be on it. My understanding of the statute 
is if his fingerprints are on it that obviously means he handled 
it. 
MR. PENDLETON: Objection. Tha t -
THE WITNESS: Or correction. I didn't mean 
fingerprints. That if he said they were ~ 
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MR. PENDLETON: Objection, your Honor. His 
testifying what his understanding of the statute is is 
inappropriate. 
THE COURT: Overruled, Counsel. You brought it 
up in your cross. Mr. Weiland has an opportunity to further 
explore it. 
Go ahead, Mr. Weiland. 
THE WITNESS: As he said they were on there, if 
they were, and they — he says they were. His claim was, 
"You'll find my fingerprints," it's an automatic that he had it 
in his hands. So that to us - our understanding again of that 
is the possession is to hold and to have it in your hands under 
your control, and that's what we went on. 
R 134, at 131-132. 
It is the exclusive responsibility of the court to instruct the jury concerning 
the applicable rules of law. See generally, State v. St Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 
323, 329 (1955). Counsel has found only one judicial decision in which a probation 
officer's opinion concerning the law was deemed to have any relevance. In Miller v. 
Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 727, 492 S.E.2d 482 (1997), the defendant was convicted of 
knowingly and intentionally possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted 
of a felony. Miller was allowed to offer proof that his probation officer had told him that 
he could possess a muzzle-loading rifle. Such evidence was admitted, not for the 
purpose of proving that this was the law, but for the purpose of establishing that the Due 
Process Clause barred defendant's prosecution where he had reasonably relied upon the 
opinion of someone who was "statutorily required to supervise, assist, and provide a 
probationer with a statement of the conditions of his release from confinement." 
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In the instant case, Agent Seegmiller's opinion concerning the legal 
significance of the defendant's fingerprints being on the firearm was completely 
irrelevant. It was prejudicial error for the court to allow him to testify that it was his 
"understanding of the statute" that if the defendant handled the firearm "our 
understanding again of that is the possession is to hold and to have it in your hands under 
your control, and that's what we went on."3 This testimony clearly advised the members 
of the jury that the defendant's parole officers considered the defendant's mere handling 
of the firearm to be a violation of the statute. 
POINT III 
THE FACTS PROVED DO NOT ESTABLISH THE 
EXISTENCE OF A DRUG-FREE ZONE. 
Without question, subsection 58-37-8(4) of the UTAH CODE does not 
establish drug-free zones by reference to proximity to motels, restaurants, professional 
offices, gas stations, convenience stores, carwashes, bus stops, or bike trails. Moreover, 
parking lots and structures are used to establish drug-free zones only when they are 
adjacent to "a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, [or] 
playhouse." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(vii). Accordingly, the only way the 
parking lots in question could operate to establish a drug-free zone is if they were "public 
parking lots.5* See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(viii). 
3While the district court's ruling on defendant's objection indicates that the court allowed 
the testimony because defense counsel had brought the subject up in his cross-examination, 
the record shows that counsel did nothing to open the door. See R 134, at 103-129. 
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Although the Utah Controlled Substances Act does not define "public," in 
its plain meaning the term connotes "[ojpen to a l l ; . . . open to common use . . . not 
limited or restricted to any particular class of the community." Black's Law Dictionary 
1393 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
The parking lots within 1000 feet of the Ridgeview Inn are not open to the 
general public, but are restricted in their use by signs which clearly state that these lots 
are for the use of the customers of the various commercial establishments which own and 
maintain these lots. See R 134, at 124-127; R 135, at 282-289; Exhibit Nos. D-5, D-6, 
D-7,D-8;D-9,D-30,D-31. 
In Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996), the 
Utah Supreme Court concluded that the owners and operators of a horseback riding arena 
were not entitled to assert the immunity afforded by the Utah Landowner Liability Act 
because the facility was not "public." The supreme court noted that the legislature had 
specifically expressed its purpose in enacting the Landowner Liability Act: "to encourage 
public and private owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for 
recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for those 
purposes." Id. at 1292. A facility is "'public5 if everyone who desires may lawfully use 
it." Id. at 1293 (citing Frawley Ranches, Inc. v. Lasher, 270 N.W.2d 366, 369 
(S.D.1978)). 
The business owners who maintain parking lots within 1000 feet of the 
Ridgeview Inn do so for the convenience of their consumers. They do not bestow a 
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benefit upon the general public and most certainly would not be able to successfully 
assert the immunity afforded by the Utah Landowner Liability Act against persons 
injured thereon. If those parking facilities are not "public" in this context, it is apparent 
that they are not "public" in the context of an attempt to invoke the provisions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(viii). 
If the legislature had intended to define drug-free zones by reference to the 
business establishments in question here, it would have been a simple matter to include 
"any commercial establishment, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto" in the 
definition set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(a). 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THE BIKE PATH IN QUESTION WAS, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, A "PUBLIC PARK." 
Subsection 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) of the UTAH CODE defines a drug-free zone to 
include a "public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center" and Subsection 58-
37-8(4)(a)(ix) extends the definition to include any location "within 1,000 feet of any 
[such] structure, facility, or grounds." Referencing this section, the district court 
instructed the jury that the bike path across the street from the Ridgeview Inn was a 
"public park" as a matter of law. Clearly, this was error. 
The Utah Legislature enacted the drug-free zone penalty enhancement 
statute in 1986 "to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from 
the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug transactions occur on or near a 
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school ground [or other public places frequented by children]." State v. Moore, 782 
P.2d 497, 503 (Utah App.1989). The law's overarching purpose is to create "drug-free 
zones" around schools and other specified places "to protect children from the influence 
of drug-related activity." State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App.1989). 
Utah modeled its drug penalty enhancement statute after the Federal 
Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. See Tape of House Floor 
Debates, 44th Legislature, General Session (Feb. 12, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Moss); 
see also State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah App.1996); State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 
1030, 1035 (Utah App.1994); State v. Stromberg 783 P.2d at 59 n. 3. However, unlike 
its federal counterpart, the Utah Controlled Substances Act uses proximity to a "public 
park" to create a drug-free zone and does not define the term. The federal act, on the 
other hand, creates a drug-free zone by reference to proximity to a "playground" and 
goes on to define that term as 
any outdoor facility (including any parking lot appurtenant 
thereto) intended for recreation, open to the public, and with 
any portion thereof containing three or more separate 
apparatus intended for the recreation of children including, 
but not limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards. 
21 U.S.C. § 860(e). 
Because Utah's statute does not define "public park," we look to the 
common meaning of the term and give it context in the stated legislative purpose of 
"protect[ing] children from the influence of drug-related activity." See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-1-106 ("All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state 
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shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104"). 
The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary tells us that "park" comes from 
Old French "pare" meaning enclosure. As a noun it has a number of definitions, the 
most common of which include: 
1 a : an enclosed piece of ground stocked with game and held 
by royal prescription or grant b : a tract of land that often 
includes lawns, woodland, and pasture attached to a country 
house and is used as a game preserve and for recreation 
2 a : a piece of ground in or near a city or town kept for 
ornament and recreation b : an area maintained in its natural 
state as a public property 
It is respectfully submitted that the common usage of "public park" does 
not include the bike paths that wend their way from Bloomington to Winchester Hills, 
from Tonaquint Park to the Santa Clara Heights. These are thoroughfares, not parks 
"intended for the recreation of children." The district court erred in instructing the jury 
that the bike path in question was, as a matter of law, a "public park." 
POINT V 
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO ALLOW THE INTRODUCTION OF 
HEARSAY. 
Parole officers went to the Ridgeview Inn in response to a tip that they had 
received to the effect that defendant was at the motel and was in possession of a firearm 
and illegal drugs. R 134, at 57, 139-140. Prior to the presentation of evidence, the 
defendant moved the court for an order in limine, limiting the officers' testimony to the 
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fact that they went to the motel because the defendant was on parole and they had 
received information that the defendant was at the motel. R 134, at 41-42. That motion 
was granted. R 134, at 42. 
Notwithstanding the order in limine, when Agent Seegmiller was called as 
the State's first witness, he volunteered the following: 
Q. [BY STATE'S PROSECUTOR] Now how did you 
come in contact with Mr. Davis? 
A. [BY AGENT SEEGMILLER] I had received 
information that Mr. Davis was in a motel room on South 
Bluff, the Ridgeway ~ in fact, the motel room was identified 
and the motel was identified on South Bluff; and that he had 
in his possession a firearm and — 
Q. Let me just stop you there. So you had information as 
to his whereabouts? 
A. Correct. 
R 134, at 57. 
Because the State's prosecutor took immediate action to bring Seegmiller's 
testimony into conformity with the court's order, the defendant voiced no objection. 
However, when the State called Agent Bowers as its third witness, the defense counsel 
did not wait for Agent Bower to volunteer the hearsay: 
Q. [BY STATE'S PROSECUTOR] Do you recall 
coming in contact with him on March 16th? 
A. [BY AGENT BOWER] Yes, I do. 
Q. How did you come in contact with him? 
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A. We was notified by agents in the St. George area that 
Ihey had — 
MR. PENDLETON: Object to whatever they notified 
him about. I mean it's obvious that there was some reason to 
go check him out. The rest is hearsay, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. It is, Counsel, but it is only 
for the purpose of explaining Mr. Bower's actions on that 
date. 
Members of the jury, even though that is hearsay, you 
are not to accept that evidence for the proof of the matter 
asserted - to prove the truth of anything asserted, but just to 
give you an explanation as to why Agent Bower did the 
things that he did. 
Go ahead, Mr. Weiland. 
Q. BY MR. WEILAND: What did you hear? 
A. Well, I was notified by Agent Seegmiller that Mr. 
Davis was supposedly in a motel room in the St. George area 
with possibly a gun and dope. 
R 134, at 139-140. 
McCormick recites the general rule as follows: 
In criminal cases, the arresting or investigating officer will 
often explain his going to the scene of the crime or his 
interview with the defendant, or a search or seizure, by 
stating that he did so "upon information received" and this of 
course will not be objectionable as hearsay, but if he becomes 
more specific by repeating definite complaints of a particular 
crime by the accused, this is so likely to be misused by the 
jury as evidence of the fact asserted that it should be excluded 
as hearsay. 
McCormick on Evidence, sec. 248, at 587 (2d ed. 1972). 
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The so-called exception to the hearsay rule which permits a peace officer to 
explain the reason underlying his subsequent conduct is susceptible to abuse. In State v. 
Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 307 A.2d 65 (1973), the court held that a police officer may 
explain at trial that he apprehended a suspect or went to a crime scene "upon information 
received" without violating the hearsay rule. Id. at 268. Such testimony is admissible 
because it merely demonstrates that the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner. 
However, the court went on to conclude that the hearsay rule is violated "when the 
officer becomes more specific by repeating what some other person told him concerning 
a crime by the accused . . . [as] the admission of such testimony violates the accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by witnesses against him." Id. at 268-69 
(citations omitted). 
In Bankston, police officers testified that they had spoken to an informant 
prior to arresting defendant, and based on the information given them, they went to a 
particular tavern. Then one of the officers stated, "[W]e were looking for a certain 
individual. We had a description of his clothing. He was inside the tavern. . . . We were 
looking for an individual that had narcotics in his possession." Id. at 266. Another 
officer testified that upon entering the tavern he had observed "four black males inside, 
'one of them fitting the description that we had obtained.5" Id. at 267. The court 
concluded that admission of this testimony was error stating: 
Although in the present case the police officers never 
specifically repeated what the informer had told them, the 
inescapable inference from [the first officer]'s testimony was 
that the informer had given information that defendant would 
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have narcotics in his possession. Thus the jury was led to 
believe that an unidentified informer, who was not present in 
court and not subjected to cross-examination, had told the 
officers that defendant was committing a crime. The 
testimony was clearly hearsay. 
Id, at 271. Cf State v. Dumars, 108 P.3d 448 (Kan.App.2005); Moore v. United States, 
429 U.S. 20, 21-22 (1976) (judgment of Court of Appeals summarily vacated and the 
case is remanded for determination as to whether admission of officer's recital of an 
informant's extra-judicial statement was harmless error). 
[n State v. Robinson, 111 S.W.3d 510 (Mo.App. S.D. 2003), the appellant 
alleged prejudicial abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the out-of-court 
statements of an informant who told police that the appellant was "keeping" controlled 
substances in the home of his girlfriend. Id, The trial court overruled hearsay objections 
of the appellant on the basis that the statements went to explain the subsequent conduct 
of police officers. Id, The appellate court reversed, holding that it "was prejudicial error 
to allow the officer to testify that [the appellant] was keeping marijuana and crack 
cocaine at the residence." Id, at 514. Addressing the "longstanding exception to the 
hearsay rule" the court stated that 
[t]o explain the subsequent conduct of law enforcement, it 
was adequate for the officer to testify that the reason they 
went to the address was because of information received from 
the informant that marijuana and crack cocaine were present 
there. However, to allow the officer to testify that [the 
appellant] was "keeping" marijuana and crack cocaine at the 
residence went beyond the scope necessary to show 
subsequent conduct of law enforcement and was prejudicial. 
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Id. at 514-15. The court went on to conclude that, had the offending hearsay evidence 
been properly excluded, the remaining evidence of guilt was sufficiently tenuous to 
mandate a finding of prejudice requiring reversal. 
In the instant case, the parole officers' purpose in going to the Ridgeview 
Inn on the night of March 16, 2005, was abundantly obvious by the time Agent 
Seegmiller had finished testifying. The receipt of this hearsay "for the purpose of 
explaining Mr. Bower's actions on that date" served no purpose other than that of 
prejudicing the defendant. An argument could have been advanced in favor of the 
proposition that the admission of this hearsay was harmless if it had been cumulative of 
other properly admitted evidence. However, there was no properly admitted evidence in 
the record that indicated that defendant's handling of the firearm was anything other than 
innocent and fleeting. 
Through this hearsay, the State was, notwithstanding the order in limine, 
permitted for a second time to suggest that there were other potential witnesses who 
purportedly had information concerning defendant's alleged involvement with a firearm 
which information was of sufficient gravity as to warrant contacting law enforcement 
officers. This was hearsay. It was not cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. 
It was prejudicial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON must be reversed and that count dismissed as unsupported by the evidence and 
that the CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and DRUG PARAPHERNALIA convictions 
should each be reduced one degree and the defendant's sentence be reduced accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 2006. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON must be reversed and that count dismissed as unsupported by the evidence and 
that the CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and DRUG PARAPHERNALIA convictions 
should each be reduced one degree and the defendant's sentence be reduced accordingly. 
'71 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t-_ day of February, 2006. 
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A P P E N D I X 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds 
of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of 
dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, 
offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody or 
control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; 
